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INTRODUCTION  
Constitutional rights protecting individual liberty have 
been subject to cycles of expansion and contraction, at both the 
federal and state levels.  As the Warren era gave way to those 
of Burger and Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court 
retreated from its broad definitions of constitutional criminal 
procedural rights.  Reacting to that trend, in 1977 United 
States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan called for 
state courts to protect individual constitutional rights under 
their state constitutions, an approach known as the new 
judicial federalism.1  That coincided with a series of rulings by 
the California Supreme Court preserving or expanding 
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state 
constitution.2 
Indeed, the California high court had been active in this 
 
 1.  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502–03 (1977).  See also William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: the Revival of State Constitutions 
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 546–48, 550 (1986).  
See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 2.  For example, Justice Brennan pointed approvingly to the California 
Supreme Court’s express rejection in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113–15 
(1976) of the federal doctrine of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), that 
statements taken outside of Miranda could nonetheless be used for impeachment.  
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 498–500 (1977).  The significance of Harris and 
Disbrow is discussed infra Part III(C). 
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area long before Justice Brennan’s call to action.  Historically, 
California was a progressive leader in developing individual 
rights under its state constitution.3  In particular, the state 
high court was at the forefront in developing state 
constitutional criminal procedure.4  In 1955, the California 
Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to evidence 
illegally obtained by the government in People v. Cahan, six 
years before the United States Supreme Court applied the 
federal search and seizure exclusionary rule against the states 
in Mapp v. Ohio.5  The search and seizure exclusionary rule 
under the California Constitution provided the defendant more 
protection than the federal analogue because, unlike the 
federal rule which covered only the illegal search of the 
defendant, the California rule allowed a defendant to seek to 
exclude evidence based on the illegal search of a third party, 
the so-called “vicarious exclusionary rule.”6  In other cases, the 
California Supreme Court also expanded the protections 
against warrantless searches in ways beyond what the federal 
constitution required.7 
In 1978, the California Supreme Court in People v. Wheeler 
prohibited the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of 
race.8  That was eight years before the United States Supreme 
Court’s federal constitutional decision on that issue in Batson 
v. Kentucky.9  In 1965, the California Supreme Court required 
the exclusion of the incriminating extrajudicial statements of 
a codefendant in People v. Aranda.10  The similar federal 
constitutional decision by the United States Supreme Court 
 
 3.  David A. Carrillo, The California Judiciary, in GOVERNING 
CALIFORNIA: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 
GOLDEN STATE, 299, 301–02 (Ethan Rarick, ed., 2013).  A notable civil rights 
case extending greater free speech rights under the state constitution than that 
required by the federal First Amendment is Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 
23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979). 
 4.  See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the 
Most Progressive State Supreme Court And What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 863, 884–887 (2000). 
 5.  People v. Cahan 44 Cal.2d 434, 442, 451 (1955); Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 
643, 651, 655 (1961). 
 6.  People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 759–60 (1955). 
 7.  People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548–52 (1975); People v. Norman, 
14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 (1975). 
 8.  People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276–77 (1978). 
 9.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). 
 10.  People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 530–31 (1965). 
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followed three years later in Bruton v. United States.11 
Finally, the California Supreme Court defined a greater 
scope for the exclusion of confessions under its state 
constitution than the United States Supreme Court did under 
the federal constitution.  In 1976, the California Supreme 
Court held in People v. Disbrow that confessions taken outside 
of Miranda could not be used for any purpose.12  In contrast, 
the United States Supreme Court had held in 1971 in Harris 
v. New York that statements taken outside of Miranda, while 
excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, could be used to 
impeach a defendant who took the stand.13  The California 
Supreme Court also expanded Miranda protections in other 
cases beyond that required by the federal constitution.14 
The main proponent for the new judicial federalism on the 
California Supreme Court was Justice Stanley Mosk.15  As 
authority, he pointed to Article I, Section 24 of the California 
Constitution, which had been adopted by the voters in 
November 1974.  This new section declared that the “rights 
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”16 Although 
Justice Mosk acknowledged that Article I, Section 24 had been 
presented to the voters “as a mere reaffirmation of existing 
law,” he also regarded it as confirming the independent state 
ground theory of constitutional rights.17  The years between 
the adoption of Article, I Section 24 in November 1974 and the 
passage of Proposition 8 in June 1982 were the high-water 
mark for independent state ground decisions in the area of 
constitutional criminal procedure by the California Supreme 
Court.18 
 
 11.  Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). 
 12.  People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976).  See infra Part III(C). 
 13.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).  See infra Part III(C). 
 14.  People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 609–610 (1986); People v. Pettingill, 
21 Cal. 3d 231, 247–48 (1978); People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 604, 608 (1978). 
 15.  See Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and 
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1088–91 (1985); Stanley Mosk, California 
constitutional Symposium: Introduction, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 10–11 
(1989). 
 16.  Proposition 7 was a legislatively–referred constitutional amendment, 
approved in the November 5, 1974 statewide election, which (among other 
changes) added the referenced text as part of a new Section 24 to Article I; People 
v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551 (1975). 
 17.  Id. at 551. 
 18.  As discussed infra in Part III, it is to the decisions in these years that the 
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As with the United States Supreme Court, the expansive 
trend in the California high court in turn saw its own 
contraction.  The California Supreme Court’s self-conscious 
reliance on state constitutional grounds to grant more 
protections to criminal defendants than that required by 
United States Supreme Court decisions drew opposition from 
the state’s prosecutors and victims’ rights groups.19 In 1983, 
one appellate court noted that the debate over the “use of the 
doctrine of independent state grounds to avoid the impact” of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in the Fourth 
Amendment context had “increased to a fever pitch in recent 
years.”20  Another appellate opinion in 1974 prophetically 
observed: “A sudden switch to a California ground to avoid the 
impact of federal high court decisions invites the successful use 
of the initiative process to overrule the California decision with 
its concomitant harm to the prestige, influence, and function of 
the judicial branch of state government.”21 
That is precisely what happened.  In recent years, 
California has become known for removing individual rights 
from its constitution by initiative.  Because of these initiatives, 
California is now unique for providing no state constitutional 
protection to its citizens, beyond that required by the federal 
constitution, in the majority of the areas of constitutional 
criminal procedure.22  This trend began in 1982 with 
Proposition 8, which eventually resulted in the practical 
elimination of independent state grounds as a basis for 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine in California.23  The 
most recent example is the ban on same-sex marriage enacted 
by another Proposition 8 in 2008, which the California 
Supreme Court upheld against a constitutional challenge in 
 
California Supreme Court looked to in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 
(1990), in reasserting the independent authority of the state constitution to 
protect individual rights against Proposition 115. 
 19.  See e.g., the criticism of John Van de Kamp, then District Attorney of Los 
Angeles in John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the 
Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California 
Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1109, 1110–11 (1982). 
 20.  In the Matter of Lance W., 197 Cal.Rptr. 331, 335 (1983) (depublished by 
In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985)). 
 21.  Id. at 335 (citing People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 941 (1975) (citing 
People v. Norman, previously published at 36 Cal.App. 3d 879 (1974))). 
 22.  See discussion infra Part IV(A). 
 23.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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Strauss v. Horton.24 
This Article examines the jurisprudential issues raised by 
the removal of individual rights from the California 
Constitution, specifically criminal procedural rights.  As we 
describe below, the precedent for the removal of the state equal 
protection right to same-sex marriage in Strauss was a series 
of cases in the 1980s and 1990s.  Those cases curtailed state 
criminal procedural rights based on a series of initiatives, the 
most significant of which was the so-called Truth-in-Evidence 
provision enacted in 1982 by Proposition 8.25  The Truth-in-
Evidence provision was initially regarded as confining only the 
scope of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure violations 
to no more than the federal rule.26  But over time, judicial 
decisions erroneously expanded the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision to include virtually every aspect of criminal 
procedure under the state constitution.27  The end result has 
been the effective limitation of state constitutional criminal 
procedural rights by judicial interpretation to amount to no 
more than that allowed by the federal constitution. 
It should be cause for concern that, despite its original 
limitation to remedies, the 1982 Proposition 8 has been held by 
later judicial interpretation to abolish individual rights.28  
Surely the power to create or remove constitutional rights 
must, at the outset, lie outside the judicial branch, just as the 
power to interpret those rights once established must belong to 
the judiciary; these principles are elemental in California’s 
system of divided government.29  Yet until the decision in 
Strauss v. Horton, the California Supreme Court had never 
expressly acknowledged that even the initiative power could 
remove individual rights from the state constitution.30  Before 
 
 24.  Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 385–86, 391 (2009).  See discussion 
infra Part I. 
 25.  See discussion infra Part III(A). 
 26.  See discussion infra Part III(B). 
 27.  See discussion infra Part III(C–D). 
 28.  See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 450. 
 29.  David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: 
Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 670–73 (2011). 
 30.  True, the opinion in In re Lance W. did observe in dicta that “[t]he people 
could by amendment of the Constitution repeal Section 13 of Article I in its 
entirety.”  37 Cal. 3d 873, 892 (1985). But that was not part of the holding in that 
decision, so that issue remained an open question until Strauss. 
An earlier case, People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.3d 142 (1979), had upheld a ballot 
initiative that had the effect of removing a defendant’s previously-judicially-
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Strauss, the changes to state criminal procedural rights 
brought about by the 1982 Proposition 8 were discussed by the 
court in terms of a limitation of remedies, rather than the 
removal of rights.31  But the state constitutional ban on same-
sex marriage effected by Proposition 8 in 2008 squarely 
presented the question of whether an initiative constitutional 
amendment could eliminate individual rights.32  Of course, 
since Strauss was decided, the issue of same-sex marriage 
proceeded to a resolution by the United States Supreme 
Court.33  Because of this, Strauss has receded from view, and 
little thought has been given to its broader implications now 
that its main holding has been superseded.34 
The Strauss decision, however, remains important on the 
larger issue of removing rights under the state constitution, 
including the restrictions effected by the 1982 Proposition 8.  
Those restrictions are particularly problematic because in 
1990 (eight years after Proposition 8 was enacted), in Raven v. 
Deukmejian, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
 
recognized right under the state constitution not to be subject to the death 
penalty.  See infra note 74.  Frierson, however, did not analyze the issue of the 
death penalty under the state constitution in terms of the removal of an 
individual constitutional right.  Rather, Frierson addressed the issue in terms of 
a separation of powers analysis similar to the one the court would later use in 
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336 (1990).  See discussion infra Part IV(B). 
  31.  See infra Part II(B, C). 
 32.  The official title and summary of Proposition 8 in 2008 described the 
measure thus: “ELIMINATES RIGHT OF SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY. 
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Changes the California 
Constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry in California.” 
The analysis by the Legislative Analyst provided additional detail:  
As a result of [a court ruling], marriage between individuals of the same 
sex is currently valid or recognized in the state. [¶] PROPOSAL [¶] This 
measure amends the California Constitution to specify that only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California. As a result, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court 
ruling of May 2008, marriage would be limited to individuals of the 
opposite sex, and individuals of the same sex would not have the right to 
marry in California. 
 33.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (the federal 
constitution “does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on 
the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex”). 
 34.  David B. Cruz, Equality’s Centrality: Proposition 8 and the California 
Constitution, 19 REV. OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 45 (2010) presents a good 
interrogation of the Strauss majority opinion based on the importance of equal 
protection to the state constitution.  However, there is no discussion of the 
precedential role that the removal of criminal procedural rights played in 
Strauss. 
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principle that the California Constitution should have an 
independent role in protecting individual rights, distinct from 
the protections provided by the federal constitution.35  Raven 
dealt with Proposition 115, which limited all state 
constitutional criminal procedural rights to being no greater 
than the corresponding rights under the federal constitution.36  
Raven invalidated this part of Proposition 115 as an 
unconstitutional revision that fundamentally limited the role 
of the state courts in interpreting and enforcing state 
constitutional protections.37  Nonetheless, by the time Raven 
was decided, decisions applying the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision had expanded it to the point that it was virtually as 
far-reaching as the constitutional amendment of Proposition 
115 that the state Supreme Court invalidated in Raven.38  
Thus, paradoxically, Raven held that the electorate’s power of 
constitutional amendment could not achieve through 
Proposition 115 what judicial interpretation of Proposition 8 
had already done: reduce criminal procedural rights under the 
state constitution to no more than the level required by the 
federal constitution. 
This Article analyzes the conflict in California’s 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine and proposes that 
the solution is to contract the current broad reach of the Truth-
in-Evidence provision.  The argument here is not that the 
electorate exceeded its power in enacting the 1982 Proposition 
8 in the first place—we acknowledge that the current state of 
the law following Strauss is that initiatives can adjust or 
remove individual rights under the state constitution.  Instead, 
this Article examines the judicial interpretation and 
application of the 1982 Proposition 8, and concludes that the 
measure has been unduly expanded beyond its proper scope by 
erroneous judicial interpretation.  Thus, following Strauss, the 
question is no longer whether an initiative can remove 
constitutional rights (it can)—instead, the question is whether 
in the 1982 Proposition 8 the electorate intended only to 
eliminate a remedy, or to eliminate the right itself.  We argue 
that (unlike the initiative in 2008) the 1982 Proposition 8 was 
 
 35.  Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 353–55 (1990). 
 36.  Id. at 342.  See discussion infra Part IV(B). 
 37.  Id. at 354–55.  See discussion infra Part IV(B). 
 38.  See discussion infra Part IV(A). 
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not intended to abolish a right.  We show, through an analysis 
of the line of cases discussed here, how Proposition 8 was 
erroneously interpreted to achieve a result that Raven 
prohibits. 
In particular, our analysis calls into doubt People v. May39, 
the case that opened the door to over-expanding the Truth-in-
Evidence provision.40  May extended the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision to apply to the state constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Article I, Section 15, on the faulty 
rationale that the exclusion of evidence under the right against 
self-incrimination is doctrinally equivalent to the exclusion of 
evidence under the right against illegal searches and 
seizures.41  May treated exclusion under both rights as 
doctrinally-equivalent exclusionary rules, which pertained to 
remedies rather than rights.42  The May court therefore took a 
right/remedy distinction specific to the jurisprudence of the 
search and seizure exclusionary rule, and improperly imported 
it into the area of the right against self-incrimination.  By 
conflating this right/remedy distinction, the May court avoided 
acknowledging that it was removing part of the state right 
against self-incrimination by so extending the Truth-in-
Evidence provision.43 
May was a controversial decision when it was decided, and 
its flaws have become even more apparent after the decisions 
in Raven and Strauss.  Although Strauss acknowledges that 
rights previously granted under the California Constitution 
can be removed by initiative, Strauss also stresses that such a 
removal of rights should be narrowly construed.44  As a result, 
we conclude that the scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
for California’s constitutional criminal procedural rights 
 
 39.  44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988). 
 40.  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 41.  When this Article refers generally to the constitutional right against self-
incrimination we will be referring to the core features of this right as reflected in 
both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, 
Section 15 of the California Constitution.  Likewise, when this Article refers 
generally to the constitutional right against illegal searches and seizures, we will 
be referring to the core features of this right as reflected in both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section 13 of the 
California Constitution.  See discussion infra, Part III(B)(2). 
 42.  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 43.  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 44.  See discussion infra Part I (discussing Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 446). 
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should be limited to the area of exclusion under the search and 
seizure exclusionary rule for two reasons: because the doctrinal 
rationale for the current rule is unsound, and because it 
conflicts with Strauss and Raven. 
I. REMOVING RIGHTS FROM THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
BY INITIATIVE: STRAUSS V. HORTON 
The California electorate can amend the state constitution 
with relative ease through the initiative process.45  This creates 
the potential for initiatives to reduce or eliminate state 
constitutional rights.46  But part of the traditional conception 
of a constitution is that it establishes a set of basic and 
inviolable rights.47  Thus, the very idea of reducing or 
eliminating individual rights poses problems for constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Although advocates of living constitutionalism 
are more open to the idea of constitutional change than are 
originalists, they have traditionally viewed the process of 
constitutional change as the continual expansion of rights, 
without considering whether their theory might also permit 
reductions in rights.48  Under California law, what restrains 
the initiative process from making the state constitution a 
completely malleable entity is the doctrine that “although the 
initiative process may be used to propose and adopt 
 
 45.  “[T]he California constitution provides that an amendment to that 
Constitution may be proposed either by two-thirds of the membership of each 
house of the Legislature (Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 1) or by an initiative petition 
signed by voters numbering at least 8 percent of the total votes cast for all 
candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election (Cal. Const., art. II, § 
8, subd. (b); Id., art. XVIII, § 3), and further specifies that, once an amendment is 
proposed by either means, the amendment becomes part of the state Constitution 
if it is approved by a simple majority of the voters who cast votes on the measure 
at a statewide election (id. art. XVIII, § 4.)”  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 386 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 46.  For a review of other states’ initiative processes see Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, 
at 391, 454–56.  17 states’ constitutions in addition to California’s permit 
constitutional amendments to be proposed through the initiative process.  Id. at 
455.  Of these, two states, Massachusetts and Mississippi, expressly prohibit the 
modification of the state Bill of Rights through the initiative process.  Id. at 389–
90, 455. 
 47.  Justice Scalia, a leading proponent of originalism, expresses this view 
that a constitution’s “whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights 
in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.” 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 40 (1997). 
 48.  David Aram Kaiser, Putting Progress Back Into Progressive: Reclaiming 
A Philosophy Of History For The Constitution, 6 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 257 (2014). 
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amendments to the California Constitution . . . that process 
may not be used to revise the state constitution.”49  In Strauss 
v. Horton, the California Supreme Court considered the issue 
of what changes would be major enough to constitute a 
revision, rather than a mere amendment, to the state 
constitution.50  In 2008, the year before Strauss was decided, 
the California Supreme Court decided In re Marriage Cases—
which examined the constitutional validity of the state 
marriage statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man 
and a woman—and held that the then-existing marriage 
statutes infringed on the privacy, due process, and equal 
protection rights of same-sex couples under the California 
Constitution.51  Thus, at the time Strauss was decided, same-
sex couples held state constitutional privacy, due process, and 
equal protection rights.52  
At issue in Strauss was the constitutionality of the 
Marriage Protection Act, which was approved by the voters as 
Proposition 8 at the November 4, 2008 election, adding Section 
7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California,”53 and which banned same-sex marriage under the 
state constitution.  If Proposition 8 was valid, its immediate 
effect would be to nullify the court’s decision in In re Marriage 
Cases and to reduce or eliminate the state constitutional 
privacy, due process, and equal protection rights then held by 
same-sex couples.  As discussed below, the court examined the 
question of whether changes to individual rights through a 
ballot initiative necessarily constituted a revision to the state 
constitution.  The Strauss decision ultimately upheld 
Proposition 8 as a proper exercise of the initiative power.54 
The main argument by those opposing the Marriage 
Protection Act was that it should be viewed as a constitutional 
revision (which could not be done through the initiative 
process), rather than a constitutional amendment (which 
 
 49.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 386. 
 50.  Id. at 385.  The court had confronted this issue several times before it 
arose in Strauss.  See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208 (1978) and Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d. 
336 (1990). 
 51.  Id. at 384 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008)). 
 52.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 385–88. 
 53.  Id. at 385. 
 54.  Id. at 388. 
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could).55  As a result, the main analysis in Strauss examined 
the distinction between revisions and amendments to the state 
constitution.  There were two questions: (1) whether the 
Marriage Protection Act was a revision because it altered the 
basic governmental plan or framework of the state, and (2) 
whether it was a revision because it stripped fundamental 
constitutional rights from individuals.56  The court concluded 
that the Marriage Protection Act was not a revision under 
either approach.57 
As relevant here, on the question of whether the Marriage 
Protection Act was a revision because it removed constitutional 
rights from individuals, Strauss affirmed that “the scope and 
substance of an existing state constitutional individual right, 
as interpreted by this court, may be modified and diminished 
by a change in the state Constitution itself, effectuated 
through a constitutional amendment approved by a majority of 
the electors acting pursuant to the initiative power.”58  
Although Strauss acknowledged that an initiative could be 
used to reduce state constitutional rights, it left open the 
question of whether a revision would result when an initiative 
measure “actually deprives a minority group of the entire 
protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more 
sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private 
discrimination in all areas without legal recourse.”59  But the 
Strauss majority opined that the Marriage Protection Act did 
not present this issue because it was a “narrowly drawn 
exception to a generally applicable constitutional principle” of 
equal protection, which did not “amount to a constitutional 
revision within the meaning of Article XVIII of the California 
Constitution.”60 
 
 55.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 386. 
 56.  Id. at 388, 445. 
 57.  See id. at 441–42, 444. On the question of whether the Marriage 
Protection act was a revision because it altered the basic governmental plan or 
framework of the state, the Strauss majority concluded that the Marriage 
Protection Act worked no such change in the government’s fundamental structure 
or the foundational powers of its branches. See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 441–42 
(Marriage Protection Act “simply change[d] the substantive content of a state 
constitutional rule in one specific subject area—the rule relating to access to the 
designation of ‘marriage’ ” ). 
 58.  See Id. at 450 (emphasis in original). 
 59.  Id. at 446. 
 60.  Id. 
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This part of the analysis in Strauss has potentially far-
reaching implications.61  Strauss described two increasingly 
severe scenarios of the removal of rights through a 
constitutional amendment: (1) one that deprives a minority 
group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional 
right, or (2) one that leaves such a group vulnerable to public 
or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse.62  
The specific application of the first scenario to the issue of 
same-sex marriage is not entirely clear.63  But the second, even 
more dire, scenario of the outer limit of the initiative process is 
given a citation to Romer v. Evans.64  In Romer, the United 
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional, on federal equal 
protection grounds, an amendment to the Colorado 
constitution that repealed and prohibited state laws barring 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.65  The high court 
described “[t]he resulting disqualification of a class of persons 
[namely, gays and lesbians] from the right to seek specific 
protection from the law” as “unprecedented in our 
jurisprudence.”66  While Strauss cited Romer as defining the 
outer limit beyond which no constitutional amendment could 
go, the California Supreme Court did not explain how far an 
initiative could go in removing rights before it ceased to be a 
permissible “narrowly drawn exception.”67 
 
 61.  David A. Carrillo and Stephen M. Duvernay, California Constitutional 
Law: The Guarantee Clause and California’s Republican Form of Government 62 
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 104, 121 n.57 (2014)  (“There is a potential problem with this 
part of Strauss. What is the doctrinal basis for saying that a partial denial of a 
right does not qualify as a revision, but a complete denial would? This reservation 
potentially sets up a difficult future dispute over just how much a right needs to 
be restricted to constitute a revision, or which rights would trigger this sort of 
scrutiny.”) 
 62.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 446. 
 63.  An application of the first scenario to the issue of same-sex marriage 
suggests the following interpretation, although a full analysis of this issue falls 
outside the scope of this Article.  Strauss had analyzed the deprivation of rights 
under Proposition 8 only in terms of the removal of the name “marriage,” since 
all the material benefits of marriage were independently available through the 
domestic partnership act.  By that logic, in a situation in which the material 
benefits of marriage were not independently available, Proposition 8’s ban on 
same-sex marriage under the state constitution would also impact the material 
benefits and thus actually deprive same-sex couples of the entire protection of the 
right to marriage, not just the name. 
 64.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 65.  See id. at 626–27, 635–36. 
 66.  Id. at 633. 
 67.  See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446. 
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That question is troubling in the context of the Truth-in-
Evidence provision, which has, by judicial interpretation, 
removed all or nearly all formerly-recognized state 
constitutional criminal procedural rights.  Specifically, in the 
language of Strauss: is the Truth-in-Evidence provision, either 
in its original form or its subsequent judicially-expanded scope, 
a revision because it “actually deprives a minority group of the 
entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right” or 
because it “leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private 
discrimination in all areas without legal recourse”?68  Under 
the analysis that follows, we conclude that, in its apparent 
original scope, the Truth-in-Evidence provision is a 
permissible limitation under Strauss because only the remedy 
was affected rather than the underlying right.  But, in its 
present incarnation, the Truth-in-Evidence provision has 
become impermissible because, under it, essentially all 
criminal procedural rights under the state constitution have 
been lockstepped to the federal constitution—a result that 
Raven would prohibit.69  So it must be that either the original 
initiative was invalid in its scope, or it was made invalid by 
later judicial interpretation that expanded the measure 
beyond its proper reach.  We conclude that the fault with the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision in its present form lies in the 
judicial interpretation of the measure, which has extended its 
scope beyond what an initiative can accomplish and into an 
impermissible deprivation of a minority group’s “entire 
protection of a fundamental constitutional right.”70 
Applying the general Strauss principle of a revision limit 
on changing state constitutional rights to the specific category 
of constitutional criminal procedural rights raises three main 
questions.  First, are criminal procedural rights in the same 
category as the equal protection rights at issue in Strauss?  
Strauss says they are.71  Indeed, Strauss specifically refers to 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354–55.  See infra Part IV(B). 
 70.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446. 
 71.  See id. at 389 (“There are many other constitutional rights that have been 
amended in the past through the initiative process, however, that also are 
embodied in the state Constitution’s Declaration of Rights and reflect equally 
long-standing and fundamental constitutional principles whose purpose is to 
protect often unpopular individuals and groups from overzealous or abusive 
treatment that at times may be condoned by a transient majority.”); see also id. 
at 450 (“Under the California Constitution, the constitutional guarantees 
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Proposition 115 and the first Proposition 8 as being relevant to 
whether individual rights under the state constitution could be 
removed or reduced:  
As we have seen, in past years a majority of voters have 
adopted several state constitutional amendments—for 
example, the measure reinstating the death penalty, and 
the multitude of constitutional changes contained in the 
1982 Proposition 8 and in Proposition 115—that have 
diminished state constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants, as those rights had been interpreted in prior 
decisions of this court.72 
Second, has the Truth-in-Evidence provision been 
expanded beyond its intent?  The text of the 1982 Proposition 
8 does not require it to be interpreted as a Romer-level 
reduction of rights and thus as an invalid revision.73  Nor do 
some of the key California Supreme Court decisions.  In finding 
Proposition 8’s restriction on same-sex marriage permissible 
because it was “discrete” and “isolated,” Strauss refers to the 
key early Truth-in-Evidence case, In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 
873, 891 (1985).74  In so doing, Strauss echoes the court’s 
similar characterization in Raven, which also discussed the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision.75  The Raven court described the 
 
afforded to individuals accused of criminal conduct are no less well established or 
fundamental than the constitutional rights of privacy and due process or the 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”). 
 72.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 450.  In contrast, Justice Moreno, who dissented 
in Strauss, did not want to acknowledge that there had been such a precedent for 
the diminishing of individual rights under the state constitution through the 
initiative process.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 492 (Moreno, J., dissenting). Thus he 
argued that, “[e]ven in the area of criminal law and procedure, in which the 
initiative process has perhaps made its boldest forays into the field of 
constitutional rights, this court has stopped short of approving the kind of basic 
constitutional change at issue in the present case.”  Id. 
 73.  See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 74.  See Strauss, 446 Cal. 4th at 444 (referring to “the discrete restrictions on 
state constitutional protections that had been found not to constitute 
constitutional revisions” in In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 891 (1985) and People 
v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142 (1979)); see also id. at 437 (discussing the “isolated 
provisions” at issue in Frierson and In re Lance W.). People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 
142, 184–87 (1979), upheld the constitutionality of a ballot initiative adding 
Article I, Section 27 of the California Constitution, which states that the death 
penalty “shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishments within the meaning” of the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the state constitution (formerly Article I, Section 6, now Article I, 
Section 17). 
 75.  See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346, 355. 
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holding of In re Lance W. in the following terms: “[W]e upheld 
a provision limiting the state exclusionary remedy for search 
and seizure violations to the boundaries fixed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.”76  So described, the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision is the kind of “discrete” and 
“isolated” restriction of constitutional criminal procedural 
rights that Raven and Strauss would permit.  But as discussed 
below, the later judicial expansion of the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision brings its effect into the realm of an impermissible 
deprivation of the entire protection of a fundamental 
constitutional right.77 
If we accept the above-described characterizations of the 
measure in Strauss, Raven, and In re Lance W., then the Truth-
in-Evidence provision should be read to affect only judicially-
created remedies, but not the underlying constitutional rights, 
nor to impermissibly remove the entire protection of a 
fundamental constitutional right.  But the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision has not been so limited.  Following the decision in 
People v May, it has been extended beyond the exclusionary 
remedy of the Fourth Amendment to also encompass 
substantive Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment.78  
After May, the Truth-in-Evidence provision can no longer be 
considered the “discrete” and “isolated” restriction of 
constitutional criminal procedural rights the voters intended it 
to be.  In expanding the Truth-in-Evidence provision, the May 
court failed to address the constitutional issues involved.  The 
result is that the decision in May conflicts with the 
jurisprudence of state constitutional rights expressed in Raven 
and Strauss.  To resolve this conflict, we conclude that May 
was wrongly decided and that the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
should be confined to the narrower contours defined by Raven 
and Strauss.79 
Finally, if the initiative were not meant to extend so far, is 
it a separation of powers violation for the judiciary, on its own 
initiative and by interpretation, to so reduce state 
constitutional rights?  One must conclude that it would be.  The 
fundamental purpose of the judicial interpretive task is to 
 
 76.  Id. at 355. 
 77.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 78.  People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988).  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 79.  See discussion infra Part IV(B). 
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divine and effectuate the intent of the lawmaker.  In this 
instance, the Truth-in-Evidence provision properly should be 
read to include only the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.  
For the courts to extend an initiative constitutional 
amendment beyond the electorate’s intent is to exceed the 
judicial function, and to invade the people’s lawmaking 
province.  Indeed, if it is beyond the electorate’s initiative 
power of amendment to deprive a minority group of the entire 
protection of a fundamental constitutional right, then it is even 
farther from contemplation for the judiciary to accomplish that 
result. 
II. PROPOSITION 8 AND THE TRUTH-IN-EVIDENCE 
PROVISION 
A. The Origins of Proposition 8 
On June 8, 1982, the electorate approved Proposition 8, an 
initiative constitutional amendment entitled “The Victims’ Bill 
of Rights.”80  Proposition 8 contained numerous changes to 
criminal law and criminal procedure.81  Most importantly, it 
added the Truth-in-Evidence provision as Article I, Section 28, 
subdivision (d) of the California Constitution: 
Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute 
hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership 
in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not 
be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial 
and post-conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or 
hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard 
in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this Section shall 
affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to 
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782 or 
1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing 
statutory or constitutional right of the press.82 
As one commentator said, “the origins of Proposition 8 
remain obscure to all but its drafters.”83  But it seems clear to 
 
 80.  For background on Proposition 8, see Grover C. Trask & Timothy J. 
Searight, Proposition 8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a New Balance of 
Defendant and Victim Rights, 23 Pac. L.J. 1101, 1102 (1992). 
 81.  See generally Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982) for other aspects 
of Proposition 8. 
 82.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d). 
 83.  Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact—A Public Defender’s 
Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 881, 883 (1992). 
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us that Proposition 8 was part of the reaction against the 
expansion of protections for criminal defendants by the federal 
and state courts.84  Certainly the use of state constitutions to 
grant more protections to criminal defendants than what was 
required under the federal constitution was a live issue in 
1982.85  A useful comparison here is a Florida constitutional 
amendment in 1982, which required that state constitution’s 
search and seizure provision to be “construed in conformity” 
with the Fourth Amendment “as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court.”86  The Florida constitutional 
amendment plainly states its intended application to a 
substantive interpretation of a constitutional right.87  In 
contrast, although the rule on evidence admissibility in 
Proposition 8 (“relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding”)88 is broad, its relationship to 
constitutional rights is not so obvious.  Because of or despite 
this fact, the courts have interpreted it expansively over time 
to include virtually every aspect of constitutional criminal 
procedure.89  As discussed in the next section, that erroneously 
broad interpretation has resulted in the practical elimination 
of independent state grounds as a basis for constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrine in California.90 
B. How Proposition 8 Has Been Interpreted For Search 
And Seizure 
The Truth-in-Evidence provision received its first 
significant constitutional challenge concerning the issue of 
search and seizure in In re Lance W.91  In that case, the court 
considered the impact of the Truth-in-Evidence provision on 
previous California decisions that required exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure 
provisions of the federal or the state constitutions, “under 
 
 84.  See discussion supra Introduction. 
 85.  See Van de Kamp, supra note 19, at 1111–12. 
 86.  FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (adopted 1982). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d). 
 89.  See infra Part IV(A). 
 90.  See infra Part II(B). 
 91.  See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985).  The California Supreme 
Court had earlier denied challenges to Proposition 8 based on the single-issue 
rule and the revision/amendment rule in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 
253, 257 (1982). 
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circumstances in which the evidence would be admissible 
under federal constitutional principles.”92  Before the Truth-in-
Evidence provision, California courts could, via the so-called 
“vicarious exclusionary rule,” exclude evidence illegally seized 
from a third party under Article I, Section 13 of the California 
Constitution.93  The question in In re Lance W. was whether 
the vicarious exclusionary rule was abrogated by the Truth-in-
Evidence provision.94 
The California vicarious exclusionary rule provided more 
protection than that provided by the federal constitution,95 
because the United States Supreme Court had held that a 
defendant could only raise a personal Fourth Amendment 
claim, not one based on the violation of a third party.96  Thus, 
the questions before the court in In re Lance W. were: 
1) whether the vicarious exclusionary rule based on the 
California Constitution survived the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision; and 2) whether any right to suppress evidence under 
the California Constitution survived beyond the minimum set 
by the federal constitution.97 
The court concluded in In re Lance W. that neither 
California’s vicarious exclusionary rule nor any exclusionary 
rule broader than that of the federal constitution survived the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision.98  In reaching this conclusion the 
majority pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s recent 
announcement in United States v. Leon that the federal 
exclusionary rule, “although once described as an essential 
part of the constitutional guarantee has more recently been 
described by the United States Supreme Court as ‘a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.’ ” 99 
Importantly, the In re Lance W. decision noted that the 
 
 92.  Id. at 879. 
 93.  See People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760–61 (1955); People v. Brisendine, 
13 Cal. 3d 528, 549 (1975). 
 94.  In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 879. 
 95.  Id. at 884 
 96.  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139–40 (1978); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 97.  In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 879. 
 98.  Id. at 886–87. 
 99.  Id. at 881–82 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974) (internal citations omitted). 
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Truth-in-Evidence provision had repealed neither Section 13 
(the right against unreasonable searches and seizures) nor 
Section 24 (independent state grounds) of Article I of the 
California Constitution.100  Instead, the court concluded that 
the Truth-in-Evidence provision had a limited impact: “What 
Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy 
for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal 
or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so 
obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally 
compelled.”101 
In re Lance W. therefore framed the issue as whether 
Proposition 8 eliminated “judicially created” criminal 
procedure remedies—not whether any constitutional 
provisions were repealed, nor whether any individual 
constitutional rights were diminished or eliminated.102  This 
distinction was possible because of the characterization of the 
federal exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon as a remedy 
for the violation of the Fourth Amendment constitutional right 
against illegal searches and seizures, not as part of the right 
itself.103  By viewing the issue as concerning only what remedy 
is available, not the scope of the underlying right, the majority 
avoided directly confronting the issue of whether Proposition 8 
affected individual liberty under the California Constitution.  
The In re Lance W. court did include a gratuitous observation 
that “[t]he people could by amendment of the Constitution 
repeal Section 13 of Article I in its entirety.”104  But the court 
immediately qualified this dicta by emphasizing that the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision affected “only one incident of that 
guarantee of freedom from unlawful search and seizure, a 
judicially created remedy for violation of that guarantee.”105  
Most importantly, the In re Lance W. decision said nothing 
about the effect of Proposition 8 on the right against self-
incrimination in Article 1, Section 15 that “Persons may not . . . 
be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against 
themselves . . . .”106 
 
 100.  Id. at 886. 
 101.  Id. at 886–87. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 104.  In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892. 
 105.  Id. at 892. 
 106.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 15. 
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Following the decision in In re Lance W., it should have 
been settled law that the intent of the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision was to roll back the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule under the state constitution.  The next section explores 
how, despite the reading in In re Lance W. limiting the Truth-
in-Evidence provision to “only one incident of that guarantee 
of freedom from unlawful search and seizure, a judicially 
created remedy for violation of that guarantee,”107 the court 
later expanded Proposition 8 to include the state constitutional 
right against self-incrimination. 
C. How Proposition 8 Has Been Interpreted For 
Confessions 
The next significant set of cases involving the Truth-in-
Evidence provision and constitutional criminal procedure 
involved the California constitutional analog to federal Fifth 
Amendment Miranda doctrine concerning compelled police 
interrogations.  Under federal law, statements obtained in 
violation of Miranda can be used to impeach a defendant who 
testifies.108  But the California Supreme Court had provided 
more protection under the state constitution, holding in People 
v. Disbrow that such statements were inadmissible under the 
California Constitution.109  The question of whether the rule in 
Disbrow survived the passage of the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision was taken up in People v. May.110 
In the first decision in that case (May I), Justice Mosk 
wrote the majority opinion, which held that Disbrow survived 
because the law of privileges (including the Disbrow rule) was 
codified in Evidence Code section 940 and so it fell under 
Proposition 8’s savings clause, which stated that the Truth-in-
Evidence provision would not affect any existing statutory rule 
of evidence relating to privilege.111  Justice Lucas dissented, 
contending that the majority was mistaken in preserving “in 
the form of a ‘statutory privilege,’ a judicially created 
exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States 
 
 107.  In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892. 
 108.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).  We discuss Harris in detail 
infra Part III(C). 
 109.  People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 115 (1976).  See discussion infra 
Part III(C). 
 110.  People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 311 (1988). 
 111.  People v. May, 729 P.2d 778, 784–85 (1987). 
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Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.”112  Justice 
Lucas contended that “[i]t was precisely this kind of reliance 
upon the state Constitution to avoid applicable decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court that Proposition 8 was intended 
to preclude.”113 
In the November 1986 election, the voters did not retain 
Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Grodin and 
Reynoso.114  The newly-reconstituted California Supreme 
Court then granted a motion for rehearing in May.  In 1988, 
this time with the new Chief Justice Lucas writing for the 
majority, the May II opinion held that Disbrow had been 
abrogated by the Truth-in-Evidence provision.115 
The May II opinion quoted the language in In re Lance W. 
describing Proposition 8 as eliminating “a judicially created 
remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of 
the federal or state Constitutions” and stating that  
[i]mplicit in the limitation on the courts’ power to exclude 
relevant evidence to the enumerated statutory exceptions 
is a limitation on the power of the court to create 
nonstatutory exclusionary rules, whether denominated 
rules of procedure, rules of evidence, or substantive rules, 
for the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence if those rules 
afford greater protection to a criminal defendant than does 
the Fourth Amendment.116  
The May II opinion then applied the same analysis to 
provisions under Miranda doctrine, extending the scope of the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision to “the constitutional rights to 
counsel and rights against self-incrimination” because the 
“reasoning and result” were “equally applicable.”117  The court 
gave the following rationale: “Both kinds of exclusionary rules 
are addressed to evidence obtained by police conduct in 
violation of constitutional provisions.  Both are based on the 
 
 112.  Id. at 798 (Lucas, J., dissenting). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the 
Emergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 157, 217 (1990); 
Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial 
Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809, 812, 858–59 (1986). 
 115.  People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 319–20 (1988). 
 116.  Id. at 311. 
 117.  Id. at 311. 
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same rationale of deterring unlawful police conduct.”118 
The opinion in May II treated the substantive law of both 
search and seizure and of self-incrimination as mere 
exclusionary rules, instead of analyzing each doctrine in terms 
of the underlying constitutional values that it protects.119  That 
conflation of two distinct areas of constitutional criminal 
procedural rights had a sweeping impact on the state 
constitution.  As discussed below, this error led to the practical 
elimination of independent state grounds as a basis for 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine in California.  This 
in turn created the kind of impermissible deprivation of a 
minority group’s entire protection of a fundamental 
constitutional right that Raven and Strauss forbid. 
III. HOW PROPOSITION 8 SHOULD BE READ 
A. The Current Understanding of Proposition 8 is Flawed 
We argue that the Truth-in-Evidence provision should not 
apply to the state right against self-incrimination for two 
reasons.  First, the best reading of the measure’s text is that it 
applies only to statutory rules concerning the admission of 
evidence, and not to constitutional rights.  Second, to the 
extent that the measure does affect constitutional rights, 
fundamental differences between the right against self-
incrimination and the right against illegal searches and 
seizures compel a different treatment of evidence under the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision. 
The relationship between the text of the Truth-in-
Evidence provision and specified state constitutional rights is 
unclear.  The Truth-in-Evidence provision states, “relevant 
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.”120  
This is unlike the Florida constitutional amendment 
mentioned above, which specified that the state constitution’s 
search and seizure provision must “be construed in conformity 
with the Fourth Amendment . . . as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court.”121  It also is unlike Proposition 115, 
which expressly applied to all constitutional criminal 
 
 118.  Id. at 311. 
 119.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 120.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(f)(2). 
 121. FLA. CONST.  art I, § 12. 
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procedural rights in the California Constitution.122  Instead, 
the text of the Truth-in-Evidence provision parallels California 
Evidence Code section 351, which states: “Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”123  
Therefore, the text of the Truth-in-Evidence provision is 
focused on the admission and exclusion of evidence—under the 
law of evidence, rather than on specified state constitutional 
rights.  This is significant because, although state 
constitutional rights are sometimes implicated by the 
exclusion of evidence—as discussed below, particularly the 
right against illegal searches and seizures—the admission and 
exclusion of evidence often does not necessarily implicate 
constitutional rights.  Indeed, the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
has been applied broadly in statutory (non-constitutional) 
areas of the admission of evidence.124  Thus, the text of the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision supports the conclusion that it 
was meant to apply to rules for evidence exclusion, not to 
reduce or eliminate any constitutional rights. 
At one point, the California Supreme Court appeared to 
reject the argument that the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
applies only to the search and seizure exclusionary rule.  In 
People v. Harris, the court noted that the existence of the 
provision’s “savings clause” is a textual indication that its 
scope was broader than the area of searches and seizures: “Had 
the intent been limited to rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure, 
there would have been no necessity to except expressly ‘any 
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or 
Evidence Code sections 352, 782, or 1103.’ ” 125  But this 
statement was made in a case deciding the effect of the Truth-
in-Evidence provision on statutory rules concerning the 
admissibility of evidence.  Thus, while the textual language of 
the savings clause indicates the provision’s intention to 
 
 122.  See discussion infra, Part IV. 
 123.  Cal. Evid. Code, § 351. 
 124.  See People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1081 & n.14 (1989) which held that 
Evidence Code 790, which prohibits the admissibility of evidence of good 
character of a witness to support credibility unless evidence of bad character has 
been admitted, was abrogated in criminal cases because of the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision of Proposition 8.  See also People v. Wheeler, 4 Cal. 4th 284, 288 (1992) 
abrogating the felony-convictions-only rule of witness impeachment in criminal 
cases under Evidence Code section 788. 
 125.  People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1082 (1989). 
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broadly cover statutory rules of evidence, it does not in itself 
indicate whether the provision was intended to cover 
constitutional rights.  The Truth-in-Evidence provision’s 
interaction with constitutional rights is precisely the area 
where the provision is unclear, and Harris does not address 
that issue. 
A seemingly plausible alternate interpretation is that the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision raises the admissibility of 
evidence at criminal trial to the status of a paramount state 
constitutional principle that subordinates all other state 
constitutional rights.  But it is difficult to justify such a new 
principle with the traditional vocabulary of individual state 
rights.  Could one conclude that Proposition 8 (which after all 
was entitled the “The Victims’ Bill of Rights”) created a new 
right for the victims of crime to have all relevant evidence be 
admitted in court in a criminal trial?  Not easily.  In fact, the 
California Supreme Court rejected that interpretation of the 
Victim’s Bill of Rights, on the traditional ground that it is the 
people of California generally who bring a criminal case 
against a criminal defendant, not the individual crime 
victim.126  Or could one say that the people (through their 
representative the District Attorney) have the new individual 
right of admitting all relevant evidence in a criminal trial?127  
Again, this formulation strains against the traditional 
conception of rights—especially constitutional criminal 
procedural rights—as individual rights against the 
prosecutorial power of the state.128 
In any event, the California Supreme Court has never 
addressed Proposition 8 in such terms.  Instead, the court’s 
decisions concerning Proposition 8 in In re Lance W. and People 
v. May have been phrased in terms of the elimination of 
remedies, rather than a wholesale subordination of rights.  Nor 
do Raven and Strauss discuss the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
in terms of elevating admissibility over individual 
constitutional rights.  And such a wholesale elevation of a 
judicial remedy, or a rule of evidence, above all state 
constitutional rights is incompatible with Strauss’s 
 
 126.  Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 442, 451–452 (1991) . 
 127.  The people do have at least one constitutional procedural right in a 
criminal case: the right to a speedy trial.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 29. 
 128.  See generally Kaiser, supra note 48, at 266–67. 
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characterization of the 1982 Proposition 8 as a “discrete 
restriction[] on state constitutional protections.”129 
This textual analysis shows there is at best weak support 
for the current understanding of the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision.  The scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
therefore should be reconsidered in light of Raven and Strauss.  
Specifically, it should be re-examined in terms of the 
constitutional issues surrounding the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule.  Because of the attenuated relationship 
between the exclusionary rule and the core right of the Fourth 
Amendment, the California Supreme Court in In re Lance W. 
properly subordinated the state exclusionary rule for searches 
and seizures to the Truth-in-Evidence provision.130  But the 
May II decision incorrectly expanded that rationale to other 
constitutional rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda protections against self-incrimination, where that 
rationale has no application.131  The next section shows how 
the fundamental difference between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments compels different treatment of each right under 
the Truth-in-Evidence provision. 
B. The Difference Between the Core Constitutional Rights 
Protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
Requires Them to be Treated Differently Under the 
Truth-in-Evidence Provision 
1. Revisiting the Right/Remedy Distinction 
The decision in In re Lance W. drew a distinction between 
(1) the “substantive scope” of the California constitutional 
right against unreasonable search and seizure and (2) the 
exclusionary rule for excluding illegally seized evidence, which 
it characterized as a “judicially created remedy” designed to 
deter police violations of that right.132  In doing so, the 
California Supreme Court was following Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and the recent United States Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Leon.133  We discuss this Fourth 
 
 129.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 444 n. 22. 
 130.  See discussion supra Part II(B). 
 131.  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 132.  In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 882, 886–87. 
 133.  The phrase “judicially created remedy” is quoted from United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
KAISER FINAL 1/4/2016  9:52 AM 
2016] THE “OTHER” PROPOSITION 8 59 
Amendment jurisprudence in detail below and show how the 
California Supreme Court erred in People v. May by extending 
the Fourth Amendment right/remedy distinction into issues 
involving the Fifth Amendment. 
At the outset, we note that the right/remedy distinction is 
not sharply defined in legal doctrine.  For example, there is the 
well-known legal maxim that there is no right without a 
remedy.134  When remedy is discussed at this high level of 
abstraction, any right must have some remedy associated with 
it to have any force as a right.  But there is nonetheless a 
meaningful distinction in various instances between the core 
of a right and a so-called remedy that vindicates the right.  If 
a so-called remedy has a strong relationship to the core right it 
protects—indeed, if the core right can only be vindicated by a 
certain so-called remedy—then the so-called remedy can be 
considered to be “mandated” or “compelled” by the core right.135  
In such a case, the remedy is better classed as part of the 
substantive scope of the right.  As we discuss below, the 
exclusion of compelled confessions under the right against self-
incrimination is such an instance.  In contrast, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence holds that the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule, while helping to promote the values 
associated with the Fourth Amendment right, is peripheral to 
the core right.  But exclusion of a coerced confession at trial is 
not merely peripheral to the right against self-incrimination; 
instead, it necessarily flows from the core value of the right. 
The decision in In re Lance W. appears to assume that the 
mere fact of “judicial creation” makes the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule a remedy rather than part of the substantive 
right.136  But the happenstance that a rule is first announced 
in a court decision does not compel the conclusion that it is only 
a remedy.  Constitutional rights and their scope are not self-
interpreting.  The scope of constitutional rights is developed in 
judicial opinions.  To call all judicial interpretation of 
constitutional rights into question is obviously untenable.137 
 
 134.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163–66 (1803). 
 135.  See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 889–90. 
 136.  “The fact remains, however, that both rules [the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule and the vicarious search and seizure exclusionary rule] are of 
judicial creation, and relate to remedy rather than the scope of substantive rights 
protected by either Constitution [federal and state].”  Id. at 887. 
 137.  See discussion infra Part III. 
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The In re Lance W. court’s emphasis on the “judicially-
created” nature of the search and seizure exclusionary rule is 
therefore only comprehensible in light of the specific history of 
the exclusionary rule.  By the time In re Lance W. was decided, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had already held in United States v. 
Leon that the search and seizure exclusionary rule was not 
mandated by the Fourth Amendment right itself.138  The result 
in In re Lance W. that the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
abrogated the California search and seizure exclusionary rule 
flows naturally from that conclusion.  But it does not follow 
from Leon that anything that can be described as an 
exclusionary rule is an optional judicially-created remedy.  As 
we discuss below, in the context of the right against self-
incrimination, the requirement of excluding unlawfully 
obtained confessions has been held to be mandated by, and 
therefore part of, the right itself. 
Thus, to describe the action of excluding a confession, 
required to protect the core Fifth Amendment right, as a 
“remedy” wrongly conflates two distinct constitutional rights 
on the basis of nothing more than facially-similar terminology 
and passes over the substantive difference between the two 
concepts.  That was the error in May II, where the decision 
simply cited the language from In re Lance W. on judicially-
created exclusionary rules, assumed that exclusion under 
Miranda was another judicially-created remedy, and failed to 
engage in a substantive analysis of the underlying 
constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under 
Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution.139 
2. Analogous Constitutional Rights Under the 
Federal and State Constitutions 
Before we turn to our substantive analysis of the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, we first address 
a threshold question: What is the relationship between federal 
constitutional doctrine and state constitutional provisions with 
identically or similarly-worded provisions?  United States 
Supreme Court decisions concerning federal constitutional 
rights are, of course, the final word in the federal system.  Now 
 
 138.  U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
 139.  People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 316. 
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that most of the Bill of Rights applies to the states, federal 
constitutional law provides a “floor” for individual rights, 
below which states cannot go.  But federalism allows the states 
to raise the “ceiling” by interpreting state constitutional rights 
more expansively than their federal analogues.140 
Given that federalism allows for more expansive 
interpretations of state constitutional rights, the next question 
is: when would a state court be justified in doing so?  The 
California rule is that Article I, Section 24 of the California 
Constitution provides authority to interpret rights in the state 
constitution differently from their federal analogues.141  It is 
true that the California Supreme Court sometimes defers to 
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting analogous 
constitutional language.142  But deference is not required: “it is 
one thing voluntarily to defer to high court decisions, but quite 
another to mandate the state courts’ blind obedience thereto, 
despite ‘cogent reasons.’ ” 143  Thus, California courts remain 
free to construe state constitutional rights above the floor set 
by their federal analogues when “cogent reasons” exist.144 
While federalism thus allows the scope of California 
constitutional rights to be more expansive than what is 
dictated by federal constitutional doctrine, federal 
constitutional doctrine nonetheless remains relevant to 
discussing rights under the California Constitution.  The right 
against self-incrimination or the right against illegal searches 
and seizures under the federal constitution and the California 
Constitution are, in some sense, versions of the same right.145  
The state bills of rights of the original thirteen states 
influenced the formulation of the Bill of Rights of the federal 
constitution, which in turn influenced the bill of rights in 
subsequent state constitutions, such as that of the California 
 
 140.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037–44 (1983); People v. Fields 13 
Cal. 4th 289, 298 (1996). 
 141.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353–54. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353. 
 144.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at (354). 
 145.  One way of explaining this is to view these constitutional rights as part 
of a continuous common law tradition.  See e.g. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 
120, (Richardson, J., dissenting) (“the privilege against self-incrimination is a 
single common law privilege which existed long before its incorporation into 
either the United States or California Constitution.”)  It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to discuss the theoretical issues raised by such a view. 
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Constitution.146  In the next section, we therefore examine 
some of the fundamental features of the right against self-
incrimination and the right against illegal searches and 
seizures as expressed in federal constitutional doctrine, which 
are likewise relevant to discussing the fundamental features of 
these rights under the California Constitution. 
3. The Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination 
Exclusionary Rules Are Analytically Distinct 
The original constitutional rationale for the federal 
exclusionary rule involved cases in which the seized evidence 
(such as a defendant’s diary or papers) implicated the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.147  But the 
federal exclusionary rule was eventually expanded to cover all 
seized evidence, which makes the exact constitutional basis of 
the federal exclusionary rule uncertain.148  When the United 
States Supreme Court first applied the Fourth Amendment to 
the states in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court declined to extend the 
federal exclusionary rule to the states, because it “was not 
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment,” nor “based on legislation expressing 
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution.”149  
And when the federal exclusionary rule was finally applied to 
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, several justices dissented, as they 
regarded the exclusionary rule as “but a remedy which, by 
penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such 
conduct in the future.”150 
Legal scholars have analytically distinguished between 
 
 146.  Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions Of The Founding Decade: 
Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution And Its Influences On American 
Constitutionalism, 62 Temple L. Rev. 541, 541–47; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE 
LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Oxford University Press 2009) 65–71; 
Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making  in the American 
Revolution, 24 Rutgers L. J. 911, 911 (1993); PAUL MASON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 114 (California State Legislature Press 2015) . 
 147.  “The paradigm here was a diary wrongfully seized from a criminal 
defendant and then read against him at trial: reading the diary in court was itself 
seen as akin to compelling a defendant to ‘witness’ against himself, in violation 
of self-incrimination principles.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 151 (2012). 
 148.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) 20–31. 
 149.  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
 150.  Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961). 
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exclusion under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  As 
Professor Amar puts it: “Under the Fifth Amendment, 
excluding evidence is not a remedy for an earlier constitutional 
violation, but a prevention of the violation itself. A Fifth 
Amendment wrong occurs only at trial, when testimony is 
introduced ‘in a[] criminal case.’ ” 151  In contrast, exclusion 
under Mapp “is simply not linked, analytically speaking, to the 
scope of the violation, which occurs before a criminal trial, not 
during it.”152 
In United States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted the view that the Mapp exclusionary rule is a remedy 
rather than part of the core constitutional right.153  The Leon 
majority stated that the “Fourth Amendment contains no 
provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of its commands” and “the use of fruits of a past 
unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment 
wrong.’ ” 154  Because “the wrong condemned by the 
Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or 
seizure itself,”  “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor 
able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has 
already suffered.’ ” 155  Therefore Leon concluded: “The rule . . . 
operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved.’ ” 156 
In contrast, the Fifth Amendment protections announced 
in Miranda followed the opposite constitutional trajectory.  
Initially, the United States Supreme Court referred to the 
Miranda protections as “prophylactic factors” rather than as 
constitutional rights.157  But in Dickerson v. United States, the 
high court ultimately reaffirmed the constitutional status of 
Miranda, acknowledging that “Miranda announced a 
 
 151.  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) 24 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). 
 152.  Id. at 158; See also Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New 
York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon 
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214–1215 (1971). 
 153.   U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 154.  Id. at 906 (citing U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
 155.  Id. (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976)). 
 156.  Id. (citing U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 157.  Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). See also New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (citing Michigan v. Tucker). 
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constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede 
legislatively.”158  Thus, while the Mapp exclusionary rule is 
now regarded as a mere remedy, rather than as something 
mandated by the Fourth Amendment, Miranda is still viewed 
as a constitutional rule required by the core constitutional 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.159 
C. Because Exclusion Under The Fourth And Fifth 
Amendments Is Not Constitutionally Equivalent, May 
II Was Wrongly Decided 
The decision in May II applied the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision to the state constitutional right against self-
incrimination.  That application was flawed because May II 
assumed, without any constitutional analysis, that exclusion 
under the right against self-incrimination should be treated as 
if it were equivalent for all purposes to the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule and therefore be subsumed as a mere 
remedy.  Justice Mosk concisely made this point in his dissent: 
“Whatever its validity in search-and-seizure jurisprudence—in 
which the constitutional guarantee is generally believed not to 
require the exclusion of evidence—the ‘right/remedy’ 
distinction seems particularly out of place in the law of 
privilege against self-incrimination—which . . . necessarily 
bars admission of certain evidence.”160 
Applying this constitutional distinction (which the May II 
majority failed to do) compels the conclusion that May II was 
wrongly decided.  May II abrogated the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in People v. Disbrow,161 which itself declined 
to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Harris 
v. New York.162  Harris dealt with the scope of exclusion under 
the federal Fifth Amendment Miranda right.163  The question 
was whether the scope of exclusion included a defendant’s 
statements used for impeachment.  Harris held that 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used for 
the purpose of impeaching a defendant, if the defendant 
 
 158.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 159.  On restrictions on Miranda, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 
(1970); see also discussion infra Part V(C). 
 160.  May, 44 Cal. 3d at 327 (Mosk, J. dissenting). 
 161.  Id. at 315. 
 162.  People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976). 
 163.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1970). 
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decides to testify.164  But the Harris court failed to present a 
constitutional rationale for this holding, and that failure 
inspired significant criticism of the decision.165 
There is little basis to defend Harris.  There is no 
satisfactory explanation for its implicit equation of exclusion 
under the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.  Although the 
Miranda doctrine is based on the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against self-incrimination, Harris relied on a Fourth 
Amendment case as precedent.166  Harris cited Walder v. 
United States, which held that physical evidence, seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the 
case-in-chief, could be used for impeachment purposes.167  
Other than that weak reed, the constitutional basis for the 
Harris majority to apply a Fourth Amendment precedent to 
Miranda is unclear.  Harris held that statements illegally 
taken in violation of the Miranda admonitions are nonetheless 
reliable—an echo of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
critics, who objected that illegally seized physical evidence was 
nonetheless reliable, despite the fact that it was illegally 
seized.168 If one is unconcerned about the reliability of illegally 
seized things, the Harris court seems to imply, why worry 
about the reliability of an illegal confession? 
But Fifth Amendment concerns about compulsion are 
broader than just reliability—government compulsion of the 
individual is itself a violation of the right against self-
incrimination.169  The conflation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments in Harris ignores the element of government 
coercion implicit in custodial interrogation.170  Unlike the 
 
 164.  Id. at 225. 
 165.  For criticisms of Harris, see, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, 
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the 
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L. J. 1198, 1214–15 (1971); 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1987) § 11.6(a), p. 485. 
 166.   Harris, 401 U.S. at 224, citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 
(1954). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  “The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the 
jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this should process 
not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible 
police conduct will be encouraged thereby.” Harris 401 U.S. at 225. 
 169.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1963). 
 170.  “It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the 
use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of 
confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of 
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evidence that existed independently before the police illegally 
seized it, the confession did not exist until the police created it. 
Thus, the confession would not exist but for the fact that the 
police unlawfully interrogated the defendant.  Harris is silent 
on this central Fifth Amendment constitutional concern.171 
Harris applied just one limitation from the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule context to Miranda.172  Because 
Harris stated no constitutional rationale for this application, it 
established no general constitutional rule equating exclusion 
under Miranda with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule.173 Harris should therefore be limited to its holding.  This 
is how the California Supreme Court treated the Harris 
decision in People v. Disbrow,174 and properly so.  While 
Disbrow acknowledged that Harris had limited the scope of 
exclusion under the federal Miranda right, Disbrow found 
Harris to be an unpersuasive basis for an impeachment 
exception to the state right against self-incrimination under 
Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution.175  The 
California Supreme Court therefore declined to apply the 
Harris impeachment exception to the state privilege against 
self-incrimination, holding instead that the state constitution 
granted greater protection than that provided by the federal 
constitution.176  That holding was correct because, as discussed 
above, nothing in Harris compelled the conclusion that 
exclusion under Miranda was constitutionally equivalent to 
the Mapp exclusionary rule.  Harris was therefore 
unpersuasive in compelling a general reconsideration of the 
scope of the constitutional Miranda rights, and the California 
Supreme Court in Disbrow was acting within its role by 
declining to correspondingly limit the scope of the state right.  
But the May II decision ignored the constitutional issues 
analyzed in Disbrow and limited the scope of the state 
 
the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are 
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a 
conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will’ [citation] . . . .” 
Id. 
 171.  Harris, 401 U.S. at 222. 
 172.  Id. at 224. 
 173.  See generally id. 
 174.  Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976). 
 175.  Id. at 110, fn. 9. 
 176.  Id. at 127. 
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constitutional right under the guise of limiting a remedy.177 
Thus, there are two major analytical flaws in May II.  
First, May II wrongly assumed that exclusion of evidence 
under the right against self-incrimination is the same as 
exclusion under the search and seizure exclusionary rule: a 
mere remedy.  As we have shown, however, the exclusion of 
evidence under the right against self-incrimination is a 
constitutional rule required by the core of that constitutional 
privilege.  Second, May II misread the text of the Truth-in-
Evidence provision, which concerns the law of evidence, not 
state constitutional rights.178  Thus, both the provision’s terms 
and the relevant constitutional doctrine compel the conclusion 
that the Truth-in-Evidence provision does not apply to the 
state constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
IV. THE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS OF PROPOSITION 8 
CREATE A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
A. The Constitutional Problem Is The Conflict Between 
The Cumulative Effects of May And The Limits on 
Initiatives Announced In Raven And Strauss 
Following the decisions in In re Lance W. and May II, 
Proposition 8 has been used to eliminate independent state 
grounds for the exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence 
(whether physical evidence or statements), leaving the federal 
Constitution as the sole basis for exclusion.  To understand the 
ultimate impact of the Truth-in-Evidence provision on state 
constitutional rights, an overview perspective is required. 
In 1989, Justice Mosk reviewed the cumulative effects of 
Proposition 8 in People v. Markham.179  In that case, the court 
held that Proposition 8 abrogated People v. Jimenez,180 which 
had required the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s statement beyond a reasonable doubt before 
introducing it at trial.181  The Markham decision held that, 
 
 177.  See discussion supra Part III(B). 
 178.  See discussion supra Part III(A). 
 179.  See People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 73 (1989) (Mosk, J., concurring) . 
 180.  People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 (1978), abrogated by People v. 
Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63 (1989), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478 
(1993). 
 181.  People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 65 (1989) (majority opinion) . 
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following Proposition 8, the federal standard applied182, which 
only required a preponderance of the evidence.183  Justice Mosk 
wrote separately in Markham to note that while he was 
compelled to concur in the majority opinion, “the blame for the 
sorry situation in which we find ourselves must be placed 
squarely on Proposition 8.”184  Describing Proposition 8 as 
“[t]hat ill-conceived measure” that “has struck down California 
precedents on individual rights as it has encountered them in 
its path of destruction,” Justice Mosk listed the following 
constitutional criminal procedural cases “interred” by it:185 
People v. Disbrow, on prohibiting the use of statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda for impeaching a defendant;186 
People v. Martin on the vicarious exclusionary rule;187 and 
People v. Pettingill on prohibiting any further interrogation by 
police after a defendant has asserted his Miranda privileges.188 
After Justice Mosk’s concurrence in Markham, at least one 
further state constitutional criminal procedural right was 
abrogated by Proposition 8: People v. Aranda, dealing with the 
right to confrontation under the California Constitution, was 
abrogated to the extent it required a wider exclusion of 
evidence than its federal Sixth Amendment counterpart.189  In 
People v. Boyd the court of appeal held that the Truth-in-
Evidence provision abrogated the Aranda rule to the extent 
that it required the exclusion of the incriminating extrajudicial 
statements of a codefendant, even if the declarant testified at 
trial and was available for cross-examination.190  And another 
appellate decision subsequently held that Proposition 8 further 
abrogated Aranda to the extent it prohibited the admission of 
a codefendant’s statement incriminating the accused in a non-
jury trial.191 
 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) . 
 184.  Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 73 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976) (abrogated by May, 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988)). 
 187.  Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755 (1955) (abrogated by In re Lance W.,  37 Cal. 3d 
873 (1985)). 
 188. Pettingil, 21 Cal. 3d 231 (1978) (abrogated by People v. Warner, 203 Cal. 
App. 3d 1122 (1988)). 
 189.  Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518 (1965) ; see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968). 
 190.  People v. Boyd, 222 Cal. App. 3d 541, 562 (4th Dist. 1990). 
 191.  People v. Walkkein, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1409 (2d Dist. 1993).  
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Thus, the cumulative result is that state constitutional 
criminal procedural rights have been effectively limited to no 
more than that allowed by the federal constitution.  The 
problem presented by this cumulative effect is that this 
situation conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence of individual rights under the state constitution, 
as expressed in Strauss and Raven.  Strauss placed limits on 
how broadly initiatives may remove individual rights from the 
state constitution.  And in Raven, the California Supreme 
Court invalidated an initiative that sought to limit the ability 
of the courts to construe criminal procedural rights under the 
state constitution to be greater than that afforded by the 
federal constitution.  The conflict lies in the fact that the 
decisions on state criminal procedure accomplish what Strauss 
and Raven prohibit: eliminating criminal procedural rights 
under the state constitution and the judiciary’s independent 
role in interpreting them. 
B. The Solution Is to Preserve Proposition 8 But to Apply 
the Limits On Initiatives from Raven And Strauss 
The solution to this constitutional dilemma is to apply the 
limits placed on initiative restrictions on constitutional 
criminal procedural rights by Raven and Strauss, with the 
result that the decision in May II should be overturned and the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision returned to its original scope as 
only affecting remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.  We 
turn now to an analysis of Raven. 
In the June 5, 1990 election, the voters adopted 
Proposition 115 (the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act”).192 
Proposition 115 continued in the vein of Proposition 8 in 
seeking to curtail California court decisions that had enlarged 
constitutional criminal procedural rights.  The preamble to 
Proposition 115 stated that it “was necessary to reform the law 
as developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions 
and as set forth in the statutes of this state,” and characterized 
these decisions and statutes as having “unnecessarily 
expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which 
 
 192.  Raven v. Deukmejian 52 Cal. 3d 336, 340 (1990). For a discussion of 
Proposition 115 see Rachel A. Van Cleave, Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine 
of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS 
CONST. L. Q. 95 (1993) 
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is required by the United States Constitution.”193  Proposition 
115 contained numerous changes to criminal procedure and 
substantive criminal law.194  The most sweeping part of the 
initiative was an addition to Article I, Section 24 of the 
California Constitution, which prevented the California courts 
from affording criminal defendant greater rights than those 
afforded by the federal constitution.195 
Raven struck down this addition to Article I, Section 24, 
rejecting it as “a constitutional revision beyond the scope of the 
initiative process.”196  In so doing the Raven court reaffirmed 
the role of the state constitution in protecting constitutional 
criminal procedural rights beyond those provided by the 
federal constitution.  Raven emphasized the historical role that 
the California Constitution played in protecting the individual 
liberties of citizens: “As an historical matter, Article I and its 
Declaration of Rights was viewed as the only available 
protection for our citizens charged with crimes, because the 
federal Constitution and its Bill of Rights was initially deemed 
to apply only to the conduct of the federal government.”197  
Raven acknowledged that the California Supreme Court had 
sometimes deferred to the United States Supreme Court in 
interpreting identical or similar constitutional language found 
in the state and federal Constitutions, and that “cogent 
reasons” must exist before the court would depart from the 
construction placed by the Unites States Supreme Court on a 
 
 193.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 342. 
 194.  Id. at 342–46. 
 195.  CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 24, para. 2, in full: 
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, 
to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally 
present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the 
attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be 
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition 
of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this 
State in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States.  
This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater 
rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of 
the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to 
minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by 
the Constitution of the United States. 
 196.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351. 
 197.  Id. at 352–53. 
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similar provision in the federal constitution.198  But the court 
held that “it is one thing voluntarily to defer to high court 
decisions, but quite another to mandate the state courts’ blind 
obedience thereto, despite ‘cogent reasons.’ ” 199 
The Raven court relied on the adoption of Article I, Section 
24 in 1974 as confirming that the California court had the 
authority to adopt an independent interpretation of the state 
constitution.200  And it pointed out that Article I, Section 24 
had served as “the basis for numerous decisions interpreting 
the state Constitution as extending protections to our citizens 
beyond the limits imposed by the high court under the federal 
Constitution” and cited eight cases.201  In each of those 
decisions, Raven noted, dissenting justices had argued against 
an independent interpretation of the applicable state 
constitutional provision, but “no dissenter ever suggested that 
deference was compelled as a matter of constitutional 
imperative.”202  What Proposition 115 proposed to do was 
different because it imposed “such an imperative for the first 
time in California’s history.”203  Raven therefore concluded that 
it “substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme 
or framework heretofore extensively and repeatedly used by 
courts in interpreting and enforcing state constitutional 
protections.”204 
In reviewing the past precedents for limiting 
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state 
constitution, the court referred to its decision on the Truth-in-
Evidence provision in In re Lance W.205  Importantly, Raven 
described the holding on the Truth-in-Evidence provision as 
affecting only the exclusionary remedy: “In In re Lance W. we 
upheld a provision limiting the state exclusionary remedy for 
search and seizure violations to the boundaries fixed by the 
Fourth Amendment.”206  But Raven did not mention that 
 
 198.  Id. at 353. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 353; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24 states in pertinent part: “Rights 
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution.” 
 201.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354. 
 202.  Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 355. 
 206.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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Proposition 8 had subsequently been applied well outside the 
search and seizure context.  Indeed, as Justice Mosk pointed 
out in Markham in 1989 (just one year before Proposition 115), 
Proposition 8 had been applied against many areas of criminal 
procedural rights previously protected by the California 
Constitution.207  In fact, six of the eight cases that Raven cited 
as examples of the courts’ ability to extend greater protections 
to individuals under the state constitution had already been 
abrogated by Proposition 8 when Raven was decided.208  Two of 
those cases involved the exclusionary rule under Article I, 
Section 13, the state constitutional analogue of the Fourth 
Amendment: People v. Brisendine209 and People v. Norman.210  
But four of these cases involved criminal procedural rights 
under Article I, Section 15, the state constitutional analogue to 
the Fifth Amendment: People v. Houston211; People v. 
 
 207.  Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 72 (1989) (Mosk, J. concurring).  See supra 
Section III(d). 
 208.  The two cases cited by Raven that had not been abrogated by the Truth-
in-Evidence provision—People v. Ramos, and People v. Hannon—did not involve 
the exclusion of evidence.  Ramos dealt with a statutory requirement in 
California’s death penalty law that the jury be instructed that a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole might be commuted or modified by the 
Governor to a sentence that included the possibility of parole, the so-called 
“Briggs instruction.” See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 995, fn. 4 (1983).  
Hannon dealt with a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the California 
constitution, Article I, Section 15, clause 1. See People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 
605 (1977). 
 209.  People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528 (1975) (abrogated by In re Lance W, 
37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985)). Brisendine held that the state constitution was more 
restrictive of warrantless searches than the federal constitution as interpreted in 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 
260 (1973). Brisendine also reaffirmed the vicarious exclusionary rule for third 
parties under the state constitution. 
 210.  People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 (1975) (abrogated by In re Lance 
W, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985) A).  Norman followed Brisendine, and was similarly 
abrogated by In re Lance W.  See John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry, 
Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to 
the California constitution, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1109, 1114, fn. 19 (1982). 
 211.  People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595 (1986) (abrogated by People v. 
Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691 (1988)). Houston expanded the Miranda 
protections under the state constitution beyond that decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 42 Cal. 3d at 609–10. 
Houston held that whether or not a suspect in custody had previously waived his 
rights to silence and counsel, the police may not deny him the opportunity, before 
questioning begins or resumes, to meet with his retained or appointed counsel 
who had taken diligent steps to come to his aid. Id. at 610. 
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Pettingill212; People v. Disbrow213; and People v. Bustamante.214 
Raven rejected Proposition 115 based on the revision/
amendment rule, federalism, and separation of powers 
concerns.  As Raven concluded, the central problem with 
Proposition 115 was that it sought to require the California 
Supreme Court to interpret the state constitution as to 
constitutional criminal procedural rights for criminal 
defendants in lockstep with the federal constitution, thus 
placing all authority in the United States Supreme Court.215  
By focusing on the federalism and separation of powers 
concerns, the Raven court avoided directly confronting the 
question of how far an initiative could go in removing 
previously-recognized rights under the state constitution.  
That issue was finally confronted in Strauss.216  Thus, while 
Raven focused on the issue of limiting the state courts’ ability 
to interpret rights under the state constitution, until Strauss it 
remained an open issue how far an initiative could go in 
changing the state constitutional rights to be interpreted by 
state courts. 
This distinction raises an important question: What if the 
constitutional amendment of Proposition 115 had been written 
 
 212.  People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231 (1978) (abrogated by People v. 
Warner, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1124 (1988). Pettingill expanded the Miranda 
protections under the state constitution beyond that decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 21 Cal. 3d at 246–51. 
Pettingill held that after a defendant had demonstrated he did not wish to waive 
his privilege against self-incrimination, the police could not lawfully subject him 
to a new round of interrogation even if they repeated the Miranda warnings. Id. 
at 238, 246. 
 213.  People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976) 1 (abrogated by People v. May, 
44 Cal. 3d 309, 311 (1988) 2). Disbrow expanded the Miranda protections under 
the state constitution beyond the federal protection of Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222 (1970). 16 Cal. 3d at 113 3. Disbrow held that statements taken in 
violation of Miranda were inadmissible for impeaching the testimony of a 
defendant. Id. 
 214.  People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88 (1981) 5 (abrogated by Grand Jury 
of San Diego County ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court (Harrison), 259 Cal. Rptr. 
404, 411, n.8 (1989) (unpublished; previously published at 211 Cal. App. 3d 740) 
6). Abrogation affirmed in People v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 4th 1183, 1222 (1992). 
Bustamante expanded a defendant’s right to counsel at a line-up to include the 
right to counsel at a pre-indictment line-up notwithstanding Kirby v. Illinois 406 
U.S. 682 (1972) limits such right to post-indictment line-up only. 16 Cal. 3d at 
98–99.  Bustamante held that a defendant had the right to counsel at a pre-
indictment lineup. Id. at 99. 
 215.  Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 353 (1990). 
 216.  See supra Part I. 
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as “This Constitution does not afford greater rights to criminal 
defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the 
United States,” instead of “This Constitution shall not be 
construed by the court to afford greater rights to criminal 
defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the 
United States”?217  Arguably, this re-written version of 
Proposition 115 might still implicate federalism concerns to 
the extent that the scope of constitutional rights would still be 
handed over to the United State Supreme Court and the state 
court would be preemptively prevented from expanding 
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state 
constitution.  But there is no obvious obstacle under Raven or 
Strauss to rolling back specified constitutional criminal 
procedural rights in the state constitution.  After Strauss, the 
question is not whether the electorate may act on constitutional 
rights, but to what degree.218  Thus, an initiative constitutional 
amendment could provide, for example, that the right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the state 
constitution does not include the vicarious exclusionary rule 
announced in People v. Martin,219 or that the right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against oneself under the state 
constitution does not preclude the use of statements taken 
outside of Miranda to be used as impeachment evidence 
against a defendant who takes the stand, as People v. Disbrow 
held.220  Selectively removing previously-announced rights 
under the state constitution is precisely what Strauss 
permitted as a “narrowly drawn exception to a generally 
applicable constitutional principle.”221 
But how many instances of “narrowly drawn exception[s]” 
could be included in an initiative constitution amendment 
before, using the language of Strauss, the “entire protection of 
a fundamental constitutional right” is removed?222  Thus, as in 
the example above, what if the authors of Proposition 115 had 
 
 217.  CAL. CONST. art I, § 24, ¶ 2. 2 
 218.  “Although the people through the initiative power may not change this 
court’s interpretation of language in the state Constitution, they may change the 
constitutional language itself, and thereby enlarge or reduce the personal rights 
that the state Constitution as so amended will thereafter guarantee and protect.” 
Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 476 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
 219.  See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755 (1955). 
 220.  See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976). 
 221.  Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446. 
 222.  Id. 
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specified and expressly removed every previously-expanded 
constitutional criminal procedure right under the state 
constitution?  Arguably, that would cumulatively achieve the 
same substantial effect in the limitation of rights, without 
technically running afoul of Raven’s federalism prohibition.  
But as Strauss suggests, at some point an initiative crosses the 
Rubicon from being a permissible narrowly-drawn exception 
into being an impermissible removal from a minority group 
(criminal defendants) of the entire protection of a right 
(constitutional criminal procedural rights).223  And following 
Raven, there is a serious question about whether such a 
provision would be a revision rather than an amendment to the 
state constitution.  These are precisely the constitutional 
problems created by applying the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
beyond the realm of the search and seizure exclusionary rule 
and cumulatively removing so many constitutional criminal 
procedural rights. 
The most obvious solution to the constitutional problems 
created by the Truth-in-Evidence provision is that it should be 
declared unconstitutional, just as Proposition 115 was declared 
unconstitutional in Raven.  But abrogating an initiative 
constitutional amendment is a drastic solution.224  And it is 
unnecessary here.  Even given the cumulatively wide 
application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision over time, the 
constitutional problem has not yet reached the same level as 
the one presented by Proposition 115.  But a solution is 
certainly called for.   
Fortunately, there is a less drastic solution, which is to 
overturn People v. May and its progeny and limit the Truth-in-
Evidence provision’s constitutional effect to the exclusionary 
rule for illegal searches and seizures.  This would harmonize 
 
 223.  See id. 
 224.  See People v. McKee, 47 Cal. 4th 1172 (2010) (statutes construed to avoid 
difficult constitutional issues); Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 23 Cal. 4th 
116, 129 (2000)  (courts presume lawmakers understand the constitutional limits 
on their power and intend that acts respect those limits); People v. Superior Court 
(Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 509 (1996) (“ ‘ If a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other 
unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional 
questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to 
the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, 
or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction 
is equally reasonable’ ” ). 
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the jurisprudence of the Truth-in-Evidence provision with 
Raven and Strauss.  And indeed they can be read together 
harmoniously.  Raven and Strauss characterize the scope of the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision as a narrowly-drawn limitation 
concerning the exclusionary rule for illegal searches and 
seizures.  Thus, all that need be done is to take those decisions 
at face value, apply them to People v. May, and disapprove that 
decision as an erroneous extension of the Truth-in-Evidence 
beyond its proper scope. 
CONCLUSION 
California was a progressive leader in developing 
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state 
constitution.  But, ironically, since this state reached the 
farthest, it exhibited the greatest retractions.  This Article has 
examined the jurisprudential issues raised by the removal of 
individual rights from the California Constitution, specifically 
those removed by the Truth-in-Evidence provision of the 1982 
Proposition 8.  The Truth-in-Evidence provision is a broadly-
worded constitutional provision, and like any broadly-worded 
provision its scope has been debated.  As this Article has 
described, however, the greater problem here is that the wrong 
interpretation of this provision threatens to render it 
unconstitutional. 
Fairly read, the Truth-in-Evidence provision was intended 
for the search and seizure exclusionary rule of Article I, Section 
13.  But it is equally fair to read the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision as not applying to the rights associated with self-
incrimination under Article I, Section 15.  Indeed, that is how 
the California Supreme Court viewed the matter in In re Lance 
W and in Raven.  And the court has never held that Proposition 
8 repealed Article I, Section 15.  Despite the continued viability 
of Article I, Section 15, the Truth-in-Evidence provision has 
been expanded to render the right against self-incrimination 
in Article I, Section 15 a nullity. 
This state of the law creates a constitutional conflict. 
Under Raven, an initiative amendment that would have 
lockstepped all state constitutional criminal procedure rights 
to the federal constitution was struck down as a revision.  But 
by the time Raven was decided, the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision had grown to be virtually as far-reaching as the 
measure Raven invalidated.  These two rules conflict.  Under 
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Raven, the electorate could not by initiative link California 
criminal procedural rights to the federal constitution.  But 
judicial interpretation of Proposition 8 has accomplished 
exactly that.  Which is correct? 
To resolve this constitutional conflict, this Article suggests 
disapproving People v. May, the decision that expanded the 
scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision beyond the 
exclusionary rule for illegal searches and seizures.  So limiting 
the Truth-in-Evidence provision has the benefit of both 
preserving the rights that the Truth-in-Evidence provision 
erroneously removed, and avoiding the need to hold the 
provision unconstitutional.  Constitutional interpretation 
analysis should err on the side of preserving rights, rather 
than assuming the voters intended to abolish them.  Removing 
an individual’s right from the state constitution is a significant 
act, and the repeal of a defendant’s right to be free from 
compelled testimony should be done neither by implication nor 
by judicial interpretation.225 
The emerging jurisprudence concerning the removal of 
rights under the state constitution in Strauss further casts into 
doubt the constitutionality of the expansive reading of the 
Truth-in-Evidence provision instigated by People v. May.  
While Strauss acknowledges that rights previously granted 
under the California Constitution can be removed, Strauss also 
stresses that such a removal of rights should be narrowly 
construed.  Indeed, the narrow construction of the Truth-in-
Evidence provision we argue for here is consistent with 
traditional canons of construction.226  The apparent conflict 
between Proposition 8 (which would require a coerced 
confession to be admitted because it is relevant), and Article I, 
Section 15 (which would require exclusion of a coerced 
confession), is governed by the rule that amendments to the 
state constitution must be read in harmony with existing 
provisions.227  Here, this requires giving effect to both the right 
 
 225.  See Ste. Marie v. Riverside Cnty. Reg’l Park & Open-Space Dist., 46 Cal. 
4th 282, 296 (2009) (repeals by implication are disfavored); Flores v. Workmen’s 
Comp. Appeals Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 171, 176 (1974)  (“all presumptions are against a 
repeal by implication”). 
 226.  California courts construe provisions added to the state constitution by 
voter initiative by applying the same principles governing the construction of a 
statute. See Prof’l Engineers in California  Gov’t v. Kempton, 40 Cal. 4th 1016, 
1037 (2007). 
 227.  See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 349 
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against self-incrimination and the command to admit relevant 
evidence. 
If the electorate did not explicitly abolish a constitutional 
right, then the courts should presume that the voters meant to 
keep it.  From that perspective, People v. May had it 
backwards: rather than effectuating the intent of the voters, a 
judicial decision that removes state constitutional protection 
for California citizens when those citizens meant to keep it 
frustrates the electorate’s intent, and harms them in their 
name. 
 
(1979) (if “the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable 
of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute 
will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the 
Constitution”). 
